Crystal Eastman and the Internationalist Beginnings of American Civil Liberties by Witt, John Fabian
WITT FINAL.DOC 8/12/2005 10:49 AM 
 
 
CRYSTAL EASTMAN AND THE 
INTERNATIONALIST BEGINNINGS OF 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 
JOHN FABIAN WITT† 
ABSTRACT 
  The modern American civil liberties movement famously began 
with the United States’s intervention in World War I. Yet these 
beginnings have long raised a conundrum for civil liberties historians. 
Why did the American civil liberties movement arise precisely when 
so many sophisticated legal and political thinkers began to call into 
question the truth value of abstract rights claims? The puzzling rise of 
civil liberties in an age of pragmatic skepticism is all the more startling 
given that early leaders of the civil liberties movement were themselves 
leading rights skeptics. This Article offers a new interpretation of the 
rise of the modern American civil liberties movement. Our ostensibly 
domestic civil liberties movement—and indeed, the phrase “civil 
liberties” itself—has its roots in a pre-World War I international law 
cosmopolitanism. In particular, the social movement that coalesced 
around the phrase civil liberties developed as a group of self-
consciously internationalist organizations. Led by people such as 
Crystal Eastman, a little-remembered, charismatic, progressive-era 
reformer and radical, these organizations had begun to question not 
just the abstract metaphysical truth of rights claims but also the 
usefulness of that other great abstraction of nineteenth-century law: 
sovereignty. The civil liberties movement in American law thus did 
indeed emerge out of a pragmatist critique of abstract legal fictions. 
The relevant abstraction, however, was not so much the formal 
concept of rights as the formal concept of nation-state sovereignty. 
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With American intervention in World War I, obligations of loyalty to 
the nation-state compelled American internationalists such as 
Eastman, her colleague Roger Baldwin, and the fledgling American 
Civil Liberties Union to reframe their critique of sovereignty in terms 
made available by the constituent documents of American 
nationalism. 
INTRODUCTION 
A paradox haunts the history of civil liberties in the United 
States. The Bill of Rights notwithstanding, it took well over a century 
for U.S. law to develop protections for dissenting or unpopular 
speech. Both the phrase “civil liberties” itself and the civil liberties 
tradition as twenty-first-century American lawyers understand it—a 
body of legal protections for rights such as speech and assembly—
date to World War I. Yet the years leading up to the war witnessed 
the emergence of powerful challenges to the very ideas of “rights” 
and “liberty” on which a civil liberties movement might be thought to 
depend. Indeed, many early architects of the civil liberties movement 
were themselves leading rights-skeptics and builders of the kinds of 
modernist legal institutions that sought to consign rights talk to a 
nineteenth-century past.1 
One prominent response to the paradox seeks to connect the 
advent of civil liberties to the distinctively American philosophical 
tradition of pragmatism and its jurisprudential analogues. Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously contended in 1919 that pragmatic 
uncertainty as to ultimate truths ought to lead nation-states to be 
reluctant to prohibit the expression of even apparently abhorrent 
ideas. “[T]ime,” Holmes wrote in his dissent in Abrams v. United 
States, “has upset many fighting faiths.”2 It followed for Holmes that 
nation-states should establish the kinds of protections for speech and 
expression that Americans today would describe as central elements 
of the civil liberties agenda. Yet until Holmes’s suggestion in 1919, 
pragmatism had more often undermined rights claims. Pragmatist 
philosopher John Dewey scorned those who clung to “the 
 
 1. Thomas L. Haskell, The Curious Persistence of Rights Talk in the “Age of 
Interpretation,” in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 324, 328–29 (David Thelen ed., 
1988).  
 2. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For an especially elegant version of 
this solution, see LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA 
(2001).  
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individualistic tradition”3 of “early Victorian platitudes” about “the 
sanctity of individual rights.”4 Critics noted that the problem of 
uncertainty to which Holmes pointed in Abrams cut both ways, 
calling into question not only legislative commitments to the 
suppression of particular ideas, but also the unyielding commitment 
to principle that underlay rights claims in times of crisis.5 And indeed, 
as American intervention in World War I approached, lawyers like 
Raymond Fosdick (soon to become the first undersecretary general 
of the League of Nations) increasingly saw “‘natural rights’” along 
with “Jefferson and laissez-faire” as just so many “mental trappings” 
from “a century ago.”6 As Ernest Hemingway would write, the war 
had called into question the power of “[a]bstract words such as glory, 
honor, courage, or hallow”—and, one might add, liberty and rights.7 
A second response to the civil liberties paradox sees in World 
War I what political scientist Samuel Huntington would call a 
moment of “creedal passion”: a confrontation between the nation and 
its deepest values.8 Federal legislation effectively criminalized antiwar 
speech; the Post Office barred antiwar and radical literature from the 
mails; mobs brutalized and even lynched antiwar speakers; and 
federal agents and allied vigilantes led lawless raids on labor unions 
and radical organizations. Events such as these, the second account 
contends, touched off a movement on behalf of ideas about rights that 
Americans had long held but taken for granted.9 Yet there is 
 
 3. DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN 
SOCIETY 50 (1980). 
 4. DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 3 (1997). 
 5. RANDOLPH S. BOURNE, The War and the Intellectuals, in WAR AND THE 
INTELLECTUALS: COLLECTED ESSAYS, 1915–1919, at 3, 11 (Carl Resek ed., 1964). 
 6. Raymond B. Fosdick, Liberty in America, OUTLOOK, Feb. 2, 1916, at 282, 285. 
 7. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, A FAREWELL TO ARMS 196 (1929); see also PAUL FUSSELL, 
THE GREAT WAR AND MODERN MEMORY 21 (1975) (describing Hemingway’s 
disillusionment).  
 8. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 85 
(1981). 
 9. E.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”: 
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 389–94 (2000); DONALD 
JOHNSON, THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN FREEDOMS: WORLD WAR I AND THE RISE OF THE 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, at vii–ix (1963); KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 72–92; PAUL 
L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 26–
30 (1979); RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 138–44 (1999); 
SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 11–47 
(1999); Robert E. Cushman, The Repercussions of Foreign Affairs on the American Tradition of 
Civil Liberty, 92 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 257, 257 (1948). For a recent summary of this view, see 
WITT FINAL.DOC 8/12/2005 10:49 AM 
708 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:705 
remarkably little evidence of a long-standing American civil liberties 
tradition in nineteenth-century American law. As one historian puts 
it, the nation’s civil liberties record instead “seems terribly dismal.”10 
The civil liberties violations of the World War I period were not so 
different from those of the Civil War. As one prominent supporter of 
the war noted in 1918, Lincoln’s “limitations of free speech” provided 
a model for the Wilson administration a half-century later.11 Indeed, 
American law had long been characterized by a wide array of 
practices that by later standards seem clear violations of important 
civil liberties. Southern states banned antislavery literature and 
speech. Congress stifled abolitionist petitions. Congress and the states 
alike prohibited the dissemination of birth control literature and 
sexually explicit materials. Laws prohibited entertainment on 
Sundays. Courts broadly enjoined peaceful labor picketing. And 
communities participated in repressing the free speech efforts of 
organizations like the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).12 
Historian Henry Steele Commager plausibly wrote of the period 
between 1789 and 1937 that there had not been “a single case, in a 
century and a half, where the Supreme Court has protected freedom 
of speech, press, assembly, or petition against congressional attack.”13 
Nineteenth-century American law, in short, seems to have borne out 
James Madison’s warning that the provisions of the Bill of Rights 
 
Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 
1, 34–38 (1996). 
 10. Michael Les Benedict, Victorian Moralism and Civil Liberty in the Nineteenth-Century 
United States, in THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND AMERICAN LIFE: CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY EXPERIENCE 91, 109 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1992). 
 11. Letter from William English Walling to L. Hollingsworth Wood (Jan. 7, 1918), 
microformed on American Civil Liberties Union Archives: The Roger Baldwin Years, 1917–
1950, Reel 1, vol. 3 (Scholarly Res., Inc.) [hereinafter ACLU Archives]; see generally MARK E. 
NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991) 
(describing Lincoln’s wartime speech policies); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE 
SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERROR 108–19 
(2004) (same).  
 12. On nineteenth-century restraints on speech and other expressive activity, see generally 
CURTIS, supra note 9; RUSSEL B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE 
SLAVERY CONTROVERSY, 1830–1860 (1949); RABBAN, supra note 4; John W. Wertheimer, Free 
Speech Fights: The Roots of Modern Free-Expression Litigation in the United States 51–67 
(1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal).  
 13. MURPHY, supra note 9, at 9 (quoting Henry Steele Commanger).  
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would be mere “parchment barriers” to acts of government 
repression.14 
In sum, neither of these home-grown traditions—neither the 
philosophical tradition of pragmatism, nor an ostensible moment of 
truth for America’s civil libertarian values—provides an especially 
satisfying explanation of the modern civil liberties movement. Neither 
account, moreover, offers a solution to the paradox of rights-claims in 
an age of skepticism. 
An important feature of the beginnings of the American civil 
liberties tradition has gone missing from domesticated historical 
accounts. The modern civil liberties movement, as well as the phrase 
“civil liberties” as a language with which to organize that movement, 
arose out of a pre-World War I transatlantic internationalism that 
transcended the national boundaries of the United States. Late 
nineteenth century internationalists had begun to question not just 
the abstract metaphysical truth of rights claims but also the usefulness 
of that other great abstraction of nineteenth-century law: the 
sovereignty of the nation-state. The civil liberties movement in 
American law did indeed emerge out of a pragmatist critique of 
abstract legal fictions. The relevant abstraction, however, was not so 
much the formal concept of rights as the formal concept of state 
sovereignty. 
This Article describes the connections between the movement 
that contemporaries called “internationalism” and the beginnings of 
the twentieth-century civil liberties tradition. No one better captures 
these connections than Crystal Eastman, an indefatigable and 
charismatic, though now largely forgotten, young New York lawyer. 
Between 1913 and 1917, she became one of the most important 
figures in early-twentieth-century American internationalism. And in 
1917 she and Roger Baldwin founded the predecessor organization to 
the American Civil Liberties Union. Yet a domestic civil liberties 
movement had not been Eastman’s aim at all. For Eastman and a 
like-minded group of transatlantic internationalists, the war 
occasioned a struggle for new supranational institutions to constrain 
the excesses of nation-states that the war had so plainly revealed. 
When the patriotic obligations of wartime placed new limits on 
internationalism, American internationalists like Eastman turned to 
 
 14. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in JAMES MADISON: 
WRITINGS 418, 420 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). 
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civil liberties as a way to constrain those excesses that could be rooted 
in the language and constitutive documents of American nationalism. 
Within a very short time, however, the civil liberties strategy 
swallowed up and replaced the internationalist agenda it had been 
designed to advance. 
If the story told here is successful, a number of interesting points 
about American civil liberties and international law follow. The 
internationalist beginnings of American civil liberties help to explain 
the paradox of civil liberties in an age of pragmatism. Rights-skeptics 
in the early twentieth century were grappling not with one but with 
two conceptual abstractions: rights and sovereignty. If they seized on 
the former, they did so because it seemed to them less dangerous than 
the latter. Critiques of sovereignty also help to explain the 
exceptionally prominent role of women in the American civil liberties 
movement. Women like Crystal Eastman were especially quick to 
recognize the dangers posed by nation-states in which they had long 
possessed only attenuated forms of membership. Nation-states had 
barred women from voting and had even stripped them of their 
citizenship when, like Eastman in 1916, they married foreign 
nationals. 
Moreover, the internationalist beginnings of American civil 
liberties suggest that even those features of American law that are 
typically described as distinctive—such as the United States’s 
emphasis on the civil liberties of individuals—are often the result of 
interactions and ideas on a global scale. For almost three decades 
now, historians and lawyers have chipped away at the myths of 
American exceptionalism in such areas of the law as torts, crime, 
labor, and the constitution,15 and such areas of reform as urban 
planning, social insurance, and even home economics.16 In these areas 
 
 15. E.g., MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000); MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING 
JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO 71–72 (2003); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL 
REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF 
AMERICAN LAW 2–21 (2004); A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (Margaret K. Rosenheim, 
Franklin E. Zimring, David S. Tanenhaus, & Bernardine Dohrn eds., 2002); William E. Forbath, 
Law and the Shaping of Labor Politics in the United States and England, in LABOR LAW IN 
AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS 201 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Andrew J. King 
eds., 1992). 
 16. E.g., JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND 
PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870–1920, at 3–11 (1986); DANIEL 
T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 2–7 (1998); 
Kristin Hoganson, Cosmopolitan Domesticity: Importing the American Dream, 1865–1920, 107 
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and elsewhere, it now appears, American law and politics developed 
not in isolation but in robust transoceanic conversations.17 By the 
same token, the American civil liberties movement has not been 
merely a U.S. product for export to the world, though it has 
sometimes been that.18 Civil liberties have instead been part of an 
import/export business, as ideas drawn from transatlantic and 
European currents in international law were fed back into circulation 
as civil liberties claims. 
Much as in World War I, twenty-first-century crises once again 
pit obligations of national loyalty against aspirations to an 
international rule of law. One lesson of civil liberties and American 
internationalism may be that such moments of conflict over questions 
of national loyalty have helped to shape some of the United States’s 
most basic legal commitments. But another lesson appears to be that 
such moments can be full of irony and unanticipated consequences. 
National conflict, it seems, sometimes shapes the United States in 
ways that few participants either foresee or intend.  
I.  CATHERINE CRYSTAL EASTMAN AND THE CRITIQUE OF RIGHTS 
Catherine Crystal Eastman hailed from the heart of the 
nineteenth-century American reform tradition. In the words of her 
brother, the eclectic aesthete and radical editor Max Eastman, he and 
Crystal grew up near the “center of gravity” of the “moral and 
religious map of the United States.”19 She was born in 1881 in 
Glenora, New York, not far from where the Seneca Falls Convention 
had issued the Declaration of Sentiments in 1848 to mark the 
beginnings of the nineteenth-century woman’s movement. Her 
 
AM. HIST. REV. 55, 55–83 (2002); Daniel T. Rodgers, An Age of Social Politics, in RETHINKING 
AMERICAN HISTORY IN A GLOBAL AGE 250, 254–60 (Thomas Bender ed., 2002); Robert 
Wiebe, Framing U.S. History: Democracy, Nationalism, and Socialism, in RETHINKING 
AMERICAN HISTORY IN A GLOBAL AGE, supra, at 236, 236–49. 
 17. Much of the focus of recent work is on transatlantic conversations, but there is now 
some work on parallel transpacific conversations. E.g., MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: 
ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 2–14 (2004); Dirk Hoerder, From 
Euro- and Afro-Atlantic to Pacific Migration System: A Comparative Migration Approach to 
North American History, in RETHINKING AMERICAN HISTORY IN A GLOBAL AGE, supra note 
16, at 195, 198–200; Adam McKeown, Ritualization of Regulation: Enforcement of Chinese 
Exclusion in United States and China, 108 AM. HIST. REV. 377, 385–91 (2003). 
 18. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 148–59 (1990); William P. Alford, Exporting 
“The Pursuit of Happiness,” 113 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1699 (2000) (reviewing THOMAS 
CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE (1999)). 
 19. MAX EASTMAN, ENJOYMENT OF LIVING 1 (1948). 
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mother, Annis Ford Eastman, attended Oberlin College, Ohio’s 
center of abolitionist activism. Her father, Samuel Eastman, served 
and was wounded in the Civil War. Both became Congregational 
ministers in upstate New York, where they eventually moved to the 
Park Church in Elmira. The Park Church was among the nation’s 
leading churches. In 1870, Mark Twain had married the daughter of a 
prominent Elmira family at the Park Church. The Church’s 
abolitionist pastor, Thomas Beecher, belonged to one of the most 
prominent families in America. His sister, Harriet Beecher Stowe, the 
author of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, was (in words attributed to Abraham 
Lincoln) the “little woman who wrote the book that started” the Civil 
War.20 His brother, Henry Ward Beecher, succeeded their father, 
Lyman Beecher, as America’s most influential preacher. And in 1889, 
upon Thomas Beecher’s death, Crystal’s parents jointly assumed the 
church pastorate that Beecher had held for thirty-five years.21 
In Elmira, Crystal and her brothers Max and Anstice grew up in 
a home that embraced the tenets of nineteenth-century reform 
movements, the woman’s movement foremost among them. At least 
in part at Crystal’s insistence, the household “was run on feminist 
principles”;22 there was, as she later explained, “no such thing in our 
family as boys’ work and girls’ work.”23 As a fifteen-year-old, Crystal 
read a paper—“Woman”—at a woman’s movement symposium 
organized by her mother. Crystal’s unfeminine behavior often 
scandalized the community. She wore “bathing suits without the 
customary stockings and skirts,” her biographer writes, and she 
refused to ride horses sidesaddle.24 Taking the woman’s movement’s 
goal of “woman’s rights” as their standard, Annis and Samuel 
Eastman organized their children’s upbringing around their rights as 
individuals, unencumbered by the happenstance of such things as 
gender. As Annis told her children from early on, the ideal of the 
Eastman household and of nineteenth-century American reform 
 
 20. JOAN D. HEDRICK, HARRIET BEECHER STOWE: A LIFE, at vii (1994). 
 21. MAX EASTMAN, HEROES I HAVE KNOWN 1–15 (1942); Blanche Wiesen Cook, 
Introduction to CRYSTAL EASTMAN, CRYSTAL EASTMAN ON WOMEN & REVOLUTION 1, 4 
(Blanche Wiesen Cook ed., 1978); Sylvia A. Law, Crystal Eastman: NYU Law Graduate, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1963 (1991).  
 22. EASTMAN, supra note 21, at 8–9. 
 23. Crystal Eastman, Mother-Worship, in TOWARD THE GREAT CHANGE: CRYSTAL AND 
MAX EASTMAN ON FEMINISM, ANTIMILITARISM, AND REVOLUTION 193, 196 (Blanche Wiesen 
Cook ed., 1976). 
 24. Cook, supra note 21, at 9. 
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movements (from abolition to married women’s property laws to 
temperance) was that each human being “be an individual.”25 
“Nothing you can gain,” Annis warned them, “will make up for the 
loss of yourself.”26 “Conformity with the crowd” was anathema when 
it involved the individual’s “sacrifice of principle.”27 
By the late nineteenth century, however, the American reform 
tradition into which Crystal Eastman had been born began to lose its 
way. The abolition of slavery removed the tradition’s greatest 
campaign, and although some abolitionists turned their attention to 
the “wage slavery” that accompanied free-labor capitalism, 
considerably less moral fervor coalesced around alternative forms of 
labor exploitation.28 In the Beecher family alone, Harriet Beecher 
Stowe turned from writing antislavery novels to running a Florida 
plantation worked by poorly paid black agricultural workers.29 Closer 
to Elmira, Henry Ward Beecher had been brought low by the media 
spectacle of an apparent affair with the wife of a prominent 
parishioner.30 To be sure, the woman’s movement that had begun at 
Seneca Falls continued. But the “New Departure” for women’s 
suffrage and political equality that the leaders of the nineteenth-
century woman’s movement pursued beginning in the 1870s had 
sputtered; despite a modest string of successes in western states from 
1887 to 1896, not a single state had enfranchised women between 
1896 and 1910.31 As Max Eastman would later remark about Mark 
Twain, by the turn of the century old Elmira and the nineteenth-
century reform tradition seemed more and more like they “belonged 
to the ‘old regime.’”32 
In the new century in which Crystal Eastman came of age, 
Americans were beginning to grope toward new ways of articulating 
the relationships between individuals and their communities—ways 
 
 25. Blanche Wiesen Cook, Introduction to TOWARD THE GREAT CHANGE: CRYSTAL AND 
MAX EASTMAN ON FEMINISM, ANTIMILITARISM, AND REVOLUTION, supra note 23, at 15, 17. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id.  
 28. DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 
1770–1823, at 275 (1975).  
 29. HEDRICK, supra note 20, at 330. 
 30. RICHARD WIGHTMAN FOX, TRIALS OF INTIMACY: LOVE AND LOSS IN THE BEECHER-
TILTON SCANDAL (1999).  
 31. Sylvia A. Law, Crystal Eastman: Organizer for Women’s Rights, Peace, and Civil 
Liberties in the 1910s, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1305, 1310 (1994). 
 32. EASTMAN, supra note 19, at 330.  
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that purported to reject the abstract rights claims and individualism of 
nineteenth-century liberalism in favor of historicized conceptions of 
society and politics as organic, evolutionary, and deeply 
interdependent.33 Eastman plunged into the center of the new 
conversation about social politics in European and American 
thought. After graduating from Vassar College, and with the strong 
encouragement of her mother, Eastman entered Columbia University 
in the fall of 1903 to pursue a graduate degree in political economy. 
Although Eastman would spend only a year at Columbia, she took 
two courses each with the men who had made Columbia a center for 
the study of new ideas in economics and sociology: John Bates Clark, 
pioneering economist and cofounder of the iconoclastic American 
Economic Association, and Franklin Henry Giddings, one of 
America’s leading sociologists.34 
Clark, like many other prominent late nineteenth-century 
American economists, had done graduate work in economics in 
Germany in the 1870s, where he developed a deep respect for 
socialist ideas that emphasized cooperation over individualism. The 
German school of historical economics in which Clark studied argued 
that classical economists such as Ricardo and Malthus had failed to 
account for the apparent growth of poverty and inequality in 
industrializing economies. As history veered toward greater and 
greater interdependence among individuals, the German historicists 
argued, the state was required to take on wider and wider 
responsibilities in economic life. Clark quickly came to agree. By the 
time he returned to the United States, Clark was convinced of the 
“beauty” and “altruism” of “the socialistic ideal”35 as against the 
selfish advancement of the strong over the weak in individualism. 
Over time, Clark would pull back from his endorsement of socialist 
principles; by the time Eastman arrived at Columbia, Clark had 
become better known for his groundbreaking ideas in the field of 
 
 33. THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE 
AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF 
AUTHORITY 24–47 (1977); KLOPPENBERG, supra note 16, at 107–14; DOROTHY ROSS, THE 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, at xiii–xxii (1991); MORTON G. WHITE, SOCIAL 
THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 47–58 (1949). 
 34. Letter from Annis Ford Eastman to Catherine Crystal Eastman (July 16, 1903) (on file 
with Harvard University, Crystal Eastman Papers, Box 5, Folder 132); Academic Transcript of 
Catherine Crystal Eastman (June 8, 1904) (on file with Columbia University).  
 35. ROSS, supra note 33, at 107.  
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marginalist economics. But Clark remained a committed—if 
moderate—progressive into the twentieth century.36 
Giddings’s influence on Eastman appears to have been still more 
important than Clark’s. Giddings was a leader in the use of statistical 
techniques in the social sciences; as one scholar later put it, Giddings 
sought to make sense of social phenomena “in terms of chance and 
probability.”37 As the holder of the first chaired professorship in 
sociology in the United States, Giddings conceived his subject not as 
the study of individuals in isolation but as the study of individuals in 
the groups in which they inevitably found themselves. Sociology was 
the study of “the phenomena presented by aggregations of living 
beings,” Giddings wrote in an article that he drafted while Eastman 
was enrolled in his classes.38 Such aggregations, he argued, had 
enormous influence on individuals’ behavior. Society, in Giddings’s 
conception, was an “organization for the promotion of . . . efficiency 
by means of standardization and discipline,” a “norm” that 
functioned to control “the variations from itself” such that individual 
behaviors would generally be found “clustering” around it.39 Given 
the structures of “social pressure” that constituted modern social life, 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century individualism and natural rights 
ideas were simply beside the point. “The aggregation of human 
beings into communities” necessarily occasioned “restrictions of 
liberty.”40 Indeed, individualism in the nineteenth-century sense was 
little more than the “riotous use” of power by those who had it.41 
Rights, in turn, were mere “legal forms of freedom” that had given 
rise to “conditions of great and increasing inequality.”42 To be sure, 
Giddings was no socialist. “Utopian collectivism” was as distasteful to 
 
 36. Id. at 106–22. 
 37. F.H. Hankins, Franklin Henry Giddings, 1855–1931: Some Aspects of His Sociological 
Theory, 37 J. AM. SOC. 349, 359 (1931).  
 38. Franklin H. Giddings, The Concepts and Methods of Sociology, 10 AM. J. SOC. 161, 161 
(1904); see also FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF HUMAN SOCIETY 144–53 
(1922). 
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 42. Franklin H. Giddings, The Measurement of Social Pressure, 11 PUBLICATIONS AM. 
STAT. ASS’N 56, 56 (1908).  
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him as individualism run amok.43 But a “third and middle view,”44 
which combined the cautious use of the state with reasonable 
competitive freedoms, could ensure the proper mix of liberty and 
equality. Ultimately, the proportions of restraint and liberty that were 
“conducive to the general welfare” turned on the “normal social 
constraint” in the community and the “stage of its evolution” in 
history.45 This was the “supremely important question in all issues of 
public policy.”46 Giddings had no doubt that the balance would be 
difficult to strike in particular cases.47 He was just as certain, however, 
that the instruments of the social policymaker were the insights of 
sociology and statistics, not old nostrums about rights and 
individualism.48 
Eastman may not have imagined that she would put Giddings’s 
ideas to use any time soon. In 1904, she left Columbia after what may 
have been either a bad final examination experience or an encounter 
with Giddings’s increasingly dim view of the place of women in public 
life.49 She decided instead to go into law. A career in the law was a 
bold decision for a woman in 1904 and 1905. Of all the major 
American professions, law was probably the most unwelcoming to 
women. In 1873, when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Illinois’s 
refusal to admit Myra Bradwell to the state bar, Associate Justice 
Joseph P. Bradley explained that “nature herself” had made women 
unfit to join the bar; their “paramount destiny and mission,” Justice 
Bradley wrote, was service as wives and mothers.50 Although 
Bradwell was eventually admitted to practice in Illinois after an 1873 
change in the state’s law, no woman was admitted to practice law in 
Eastman’s home state of New York until 1886. By 1910, there were 
only 133 women among the 17,000 lawyers across the state, and only 
558 women among the more than 114,000 lawyers nationwide. Even 
 
 43. Franklin H. Giddings, Government or Human Evolution: Individualism and 
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 48. Franklin H. Giddings & Agnes Mathilde Wergeland, The Ethics of Socialism, 1 INT’L J. 
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as late as 1920, women would make up 5 percent of all physicians and 
4.7 percent of all scientists, but only 1.4 percent of all lawyers in the 
country.51 
Columbia’s law school did not admit women, but the law school 
at New York University did. By the time Crystal enrolled in 1905, 
New York University had become the leading school for training 
women lawyers in the United States.52 Crystal quickly became part of 
a close-knit circle of women lawyers, and she just as quickly 
developed a deep enthusiasm for the law. “I am even more wild than 
before to be a lawyer,” she confided to her brother.53 By her second 
year of two at law school, she had emerged as one of the school’s 
leading students—the second vice-president of the class, a champion 
of law school causes, and a friend of everyone from faculty members 
to the school janitor.54 
But for Eastman, as for so many woman lawyers in the twentieth 
century, success in law school did not translate into professional 
success after graduation. She sought out a law office in which she 
could get “started with a good practice.”55 “My mind is just tingling to 
get to practising law,” she wrote to Max.56 In particular, she picked 
out the representation of plaintiffs in negligence cases and personal 
injury suits as a specialty. To be sure, relatively few accident victims 
in the first decade of the twentieth century chose to sue, and 
practicing in the field offered little remuneration and even less 
prestige. Nonetheless, Eastman came to believe that in such cases “a 
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lawyer has every chance of winning before a jury if he . . . knows the 
business.”57 Yet she proved unable to get work even in this low-
prestige and poorly-paid area of the law. Her connections to a few 
reform-minded New York lawyers, like the prominent socialist 
Morris Hillquit and leading labor lawyer George W. Alger, failed to 
produce employment prospects. In fact, the refusal of male lawyers to 
practice with women effectively kept her out of the profession 
altogether. Crystal Eastman would never actually practice law.58 
Instead, after taking the bar examination, Eastman went to 
Pittsburgh in the fall of 1907 to begin what was scheduled to be a two-
month investigation of industrial accidents and the law for the 
Pittsburgh Survey, a survey of social conditions in the nation’s most 
important industrial city. Her friend Paul Kellogg, an editor and 
progressive reformer with whom she had an ongoing flirtation, had 
hired her onto the project.59 Though her interest in practicing law 
initially made her a reluctant participant, she soon began to turn with 
more and more energy to the investigation of industrial accidents. 
Here was work that tapped both her legal training and her training in 
sociology. “Strange to say,” she noted to her mother, “my spirits 
thrive on all this atmosphere of death and destruction.”60 “Statistics,” 
it turned out, the “records of tragedies” that she collected in the 
coroner’s office, were not so much depressing as “interesting to me 
sociologically.”61 Her two-month engagement turned into a full year, 
and she spent the first half of 1908 bringing Giddings’ statistical 
empirics to the study of work accidents, tabulating hundreds of 
injuries and fatalities into carefully presented tables documenting the 
human wreckage of the steel mills, coal mines, and railroads of 
western Pennsylvania.62 
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In fact, although Eastman seems to have had only the vaguest 
sense of this when she began the Pittsburgh study, industrial accidents 
provided an ideal field for bringing the new currents in sociological 
thought to bear on the law. When she arrived in Pittsburgh in the fall 
of 1907, the United States had experienced three decades of 
extraordinarily high industrial accident rates. Relative to other 
industrializing nations, American workplaces were characterized by 
lax and poorly enforced safety regulations. The law of employers’ 
liability, moreover, imposed relatively few financial obligations on 
employers for injuries to their employees. These factors, among 
others, had combined to make American work accident rates far 
greater than those in western European nations. By the first decade 
of the twentieth century, leading lawyers, politicians, and muckraking 
journalists alike had begun to focus public attention on the problem.63 
Critics of the law of employers’ liability, as the law of torts in the 
workplace was known, argued that it was based in the nineteenth-
century rights-based thinking that sociologists like Giddings now 
described as anachronistic. Nineteenth-century jurists had sought to 
develop the law of torts as a kind of applied discipline in liberal 
political theory that would uphold each individual’s right to act as he 
pleased so long as he did not do harm to others. Employees could 
generally recover compensation from their employers in work 
accident cases only if they could show that the employer had acted 
outside the scope of its rightful sphere of action by injuring the 
employee through some negligent or intentionally harmful act. If the 
employer had acted within its rights (or if the employee had acted 
outside his rights by a negligent act of his own), the employee could 
not recover. Employees’ torts cases against employers thus turned on 
an inquiry into the relative rights and duties of the parties. Yet such 
inquiries all too often proved intractable. For one thing, it was 
extraordinarily time-consuming and costly to conduct trials into the 
nuances of the parties’ behavior. Perhaps more troublingly, it seemed 
increasingly apparent that a significant percentage of work accidents 
could not be traced to the fault of anyone at all. Even when no one 
seemed to have acted outside of their rights, injuries occurred. Such 
injuries were simply the inevitable fallout from dangerous work, and 
whether or not they could be attributed to some individual or 
institution’s fault, the existence of a grave social problem—the 
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destitution of thousands upon thousands of families each year—
seemed abundantly clear.64  
Between 1908 and 1910, Eastman did as much as any American 
lawyer to direct public discourse about work accidents away from 
tortured inquiries into the rights and duties of employer and 
employee, toward the aggregate treatment of social needs. Beginning 
in the 1880s, western European nations—first Germany, then 
England, and then France—had enacted workmen’s compensation 
statutes that sought to eliminate questions of right and duty, instead 
providing injured workers with a guaranteed insurance payment.65 
Injured employees were not made whole in workmen’s compensation 
programs. Compensation levels sought merely to provide for their 
needs, not to restore them to the status quo ante as if in response to a 
violation of their rights. But for Eastman, as for Giddings before her, 
talk of rights was largely a futile exercise. Employee injuries were not 
so much a problem of conflicting rights and duties as a problem of 
“national economy.”66 “Each year” turned out industrial injuries, 
noted one student of work safety conditions, just “as surely as the 
mills ran full and the railroads prospered.”67 Yet what Eastman called 
the “American System” of distributing accident costs “on the basis of 
old individualistic legal theory” made a “necessary national loss” into 
“an absolutely unnecessary amount of national deprivation.”68 What 
was needed was nothing short of a revolution in the way American 
law dealt with the problem, and the statistical methods that Eastman 
had learned in graduate school were (she decided) “good stuff” with 
which to “start a revolution.”69 Statistics would establish that “justice 
between individuals” was a quixotic aim in the work accident field.70 
All the law could do was to seek “a distribution of the loss which shall 
be to the best interests of all concerned.”71 Workmen’s compensation 
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statutes would vindicate the social interests that Eastman saw as the 
proper aim of twentieth-century accident law.72 
Eastman’s involvement in the Pittsburgh Survey brought her to 
the attention of the growing number of lawmakers interested in 
substituting workmen’s compensation’s insurance system for tort 
law’s rights and duties. “The book of fame,” as she put it to her 
brother Max, was unrolling for her.73 By late 1908, she was actively 
sought after for speaking engagements and articles on a topic that was 
quickly moving to the forefront of the political agenda. And in June 
1909, at the suggestion of one of her professors at Vassar, Governor 
Charles Evans Hughes named her secretary to the Wainwright 
Commission, created to investigate the problem of work accidents in 
the state of New York and to recommend new legislation to address 
it.74 Completion of her work on the Pittsburgh Survey prevented 
Eastman from participating as fully in the work of the Commission as 
she might have liked. But her imprint on the Commission’s influential 
report—significant portions of which were allocated to her for 
drafting—was abundantly evident.75 
Even as the workmen’s compensation movement got underway, 
however, the nineteenth-century legal tradition of liberal, rights-
based jurisprudence seemed to obstruct efforts to rationalize the law 
of workplace accidents. Legislation purporting to regulate the 
employment contract seemed all too often to be struck down by 
courts as unconstitutional interference with rights of contract and 
liberty. Eastman, like many others, feared that constitutional 
provisions “originally intended . . . to safeguard the rights of the 
people” would now be used to strike down the important reforms 
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contained in the workmen’s compensation statutes.76 Sure enough, in 
March 1911, New York State’s highest court struck down the new 
workmen’s compensation law on which Eastman had worked as a 
violation of employers’ property rights.77 The rights tradition of 
American law had once again obstructed the sociological 
rationalization of the law.78 
For many, the decision of the New York court set off a search for 
ways to accommodate workmen’s compensation statutes to the 
constitutional rights of employers. For Eastman, however, the court’s 
decision marked the end of her involvement in sociological law 
reform. The decision came at a difficult time for her. Her mother, 
Annis, had died of a stroke the previous October. In January, 
Eastman had come down with one of the illnesses that would plague 
her for the rest of her life, causing her to return home to Elmira and 
to break off her work with the Wainwright Commission. To be sure, 
she had married a young man named Wallace Benedict, who shared 
some of her interests in the insurance industry. But both she and Max, 
who married at almost exactly the same time, seem to have rushed 
into their marriages in an attempt to compensate for their mother’s 
death. Already in early 1911 Crystal was beginning to dread the 
impending move from the eclectic excitement of New York to 
“Bennie’s” hometown of Milwaukee.79  
One day after the New York court struck down the workmen’s 
compensation law on which she had labored, the infamous Triangle 
Shirt-Waist Fire killed 146 people only blocks from Eastman’s 
Greenwich Village apartment. Many of the dead were young women 
who had been working behind locked doors and ill-secured fire 
escapes at the Triangle Shirt-Waist Company.80 The fire, she wrote 
Max, “sank into my soul,” giving rise to a “constant stirring sense of 
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tragedy and horror.”81 Combined with the court decision of the 
previous day, the Triangle Fire seemed to pose starkly the ways in 
which the social reform of American law had run headlong into the 
institutions of the nineteenth-century state. Eastman’s sociological 
skepticism about rights and her progressive reform optimism about 
the capacity of rational, sociologically informed legal institutions now 
gave way to fiery radicalism. “Benevolent talk about workingmen’s 
insurance and compensation” might “appease our sense of right,” 
Eastman announced, but after events like the Triangle Fire “what we 
want is to start a revolution.”82 
Within two years, Eastman left Milwaukee—and indeed the 
United States altogether—for a European tour with Bennie in tow. In 
Europe, she would come into contact with the beginnings of an 
internationalist movement for woman’s suffrage, a movement that 
sought to transcend the boundaries of the nation-states that had so 
long excluded women from full citizenship.83 What she could not have 
guessed then was that the new internationalist venture on which she 
had embarked would soon bring her back around to the relationship 
between individual rights and the new institutions of the modern 
state. This time, however, she would be a crucial figure in the 
conversion of the internationalist impulse into the modern American 
civil liberties tradition. Through the looking glass of internationalism, 
Crystal Eastman would return to nineteenth-century rights claims as 
the quintessential strategy for resistance to the modern state that she 
had helped design. 
II.  INTERNATIONALISM AND THE CRITIQUE OF SOVEREIGNTY 
On August 29, 1914, 1500 women paraded silently down Fifth 
Avenue in New York City from Fifty-Eighth Street to Seventeenth 
Street. An “intense hush prevailed” along the parade route, reported 
the New York Herald, broken only by the “dirge-like roll of the 
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muffled drums” that accompanied the marchers.84 The great mass of 
the marchers were “robed in black,” wrote the New York Times.85 In 
contrast, the banner carriers, carrying a banner of a dove with an 
olive branch, were dressed in white with black armbands. “There 
were women of all nations,” from India and China to Russia and 
Germany, “but they all wore the mourning symbol to show that” 
notwithstanding the war that had broken out in Europe, “they 
marched not as nations, but as sorrowing women together.”86 
The Woman’s Peace Parade, which Crystal Eastman helped 
organize, marked the beginnings of World War I. The parade also 
touched off a movement against American intervention in the Great 
War. Over the course of the next two years, the peace movement 
produced a host of organizations opposed to the war and to the 
United States’s possible intervention in it. With Eastman’s help, 
Chicago social worker and public intellectual Jane Addams and 
American woman’s suffrage leader Carrie Chapman Catt formed the 
Woman’s Peace Party in January 1915. Eastman herself—along with 
her old friend Paul Kellogg and the prominent settlement house 
leader Lillian Wald—organized the American Union Against 
Militarism in December and January, 1915–16. Similar associations 
(with almost all of which Eastman had significant contact) included 
the Union for Democratic Control, the People’s Council, the 
American Conference for Democracy and Terms of Peace, the 
American League to Limit Armaments, the American Neutral 
Conference Committee, the Emergency Peace Federation, and the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation, all of which sprung up in the period 
between 1914 and 1917 in hopes of discouraging American entry into 
the war.87  
The Woman’s Peace Parade Committee and the organizations 
that followed in its wake formed the American wing of what 
international lawyer Nathaniel Berman calls “international legal 
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modernism.”88 Indeed, when Crystal Eastman and colleagues like 
Addams and Wald took up the fight against militarism and war in 
1914, their efforts were the culmination of more than four decades of 
ideas in the United States and in Europe about the development of 
new transnational legal structures. As the symbolism of the 1914 
parade indicated, among the most important of these ideas was the 
notion that sovereign nation-states ought to be subordinated to 
international institutions.  
Discussions among “internationalists,” as they typically called 
themselves, often began with an observation that (in a variety of 
related forms) has continued to be made ever since, right up into 
discussions of twenty-first-century globalization. Technology, they 
announced, had made the world a smaller place. As Eastman’s 
teacher Giddings was fond of observing, the extension of 
“communication throughout the world”89 by means of a century of 
technological advances, from the steamship and the railroad, to the 
telegraph, the telephone, and the wireless radio, had brought the 
nations, races, and civilizations of the world into closer contact than 
ever before.90 International treaties and fledgling international 
organizations followed. European nations signed a multilateral 
convention on telegraph communications in 1865. The Universal 
Postal Union followed nine years later, and in 1890 European 
diplomats crafted a uniform law for the international transport of 
goods by rail.91 
All told, the century following the end of the Napoleonic Wars 
witnessed the promulgation of an extraordinary outpouring of 
international treaties: some sixteen thousand by one count.92 Many of 
these were traditional bilateral treaty agreements between states. An 
increasing number of them were multilateral, lawmaking treaties on 
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issues ranging from tariffs, copyrights, and patents, to the treatment 
of war wounded. The crowning achievements of the multilateral 
agreements of the late-nineteenth-century international lawyers were 
the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Initiated by Czar Nicholas 
II, who secretly feared that he would be unable to keep up in the 
European arms race, the Conferences sought (among other things) to 
create international agreements for the peaceful resolution of 
disputes among nation-states. Although the agreements that emerged 
from the Conferences were hedged with reservations, the First 
Conference produced a Permanent Court of Arbitration for the 
pacific resolution of international disputes.93 The Second Conference, 
in turn, strengthened the Court of Arbitration and authorized the 
creation of an International Prize Court to decide disputes over 
vessels and cargo seized on the high seas.94 Much remained to be 
done, but many participants believed that much had been 
accomplished; in the words of the closing address of the Second 
Conference, the Conference had made the “greatest” progress “that 
mankind has ever made” toward “the maintenance of peaceful 
relations between nations.”95  
The Hague Conferences quickly captured the hearts and minds 
of international lawyers. Even before the Hague Conferences, the 
gradual development of international institutions had encouraged “a 
new professional self-awareness and enthusiasm” among 
international lawyers in Europe and in the United States, committed 
to the spreading of what a small but enthusiastic young group of 
European lawyers in 1867 called “l’esprit d’ internationalité.”96 By the 
end of 1868, a cadre of international lawyers from England, Italy, and 
the Netherlands began publishing a professional journal, the Revue de 
droit international et de législation comparée. A professional 
association, the Institut de Droit International, was founded in 
Belgium in 1873. In the same year, another group of European 
international lawyers formed the Association for the Reform and 
Codification of the Law of Nations. Internationalism, in short, was 
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developing an organized constituency with a professional self-
consciousness.97  
American internationalists followed fast on the heels of the 
European international lawyers. Beginning in 1895, peace advocates, 
leading businessmen, and international lawyers gathered for annual 
conferences on international arbitration at Lake Mohonk in the 
foothills of New York’s Catskill Mountains to discuss alternatives to 
armed conflict in the resolution of disputes among nations.98 The next 
year, eminent figures in business, education, the ministry, law, 
medicine, and the armed forces held an American Conference on 
International Arbitration in Washington; they reconvened at a 
Second American Conference in 1904, at which labor unions, 
chambers of commerce, and the mayors and governors of dozens of 
cities and states expressed ardent support for the arbitration of 
international disputes.99 In 1905, a group of international lawyers at 
the Lake Mohonk Conference established the American Society for 
International Law.100 The American Association for International 
Conciliation was founded in 1906 to “awaken interest” in 
“international law, international conduct, and international 
organization.”101 The New York Peace Society, established that same 
year, brought together men of affairs in New York City, as did similar 
associations in places like Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, and Maryland.102 
A National Peace Congress met in New York in 1907, spinning off 
new peace and arbitration advocacy groups of its own, including the 
American School Peace League, dedicated to teaching “broad ideas 
of international justice, universal brotherhood, and world 
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WITT FINAL.DOC 8/12/2005 10:49 AM 
728 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:705 
organization” in American schools.103 In July 1910, wealthy publisher 
Edward Ginn founded the World Peace Foundation with a grant of 
$1 million, and in December of the same year, Andrew Carnegie 
endowed the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace with a 
massive $10 million gift.104  
From the proliferation of American international law and peace 
organizations came what one historian has called a “veritable flood of 
plans for world courts, world federation, and world government.”105 
Indeed, American international lawyers adopted an often utopian 
exuberance about the prospects for international order. The 
formation of international law institutions and peace organizations 
led many American international lawyers—along with many of their 
peers across the Atlantic—to hope that they were watching the 
dawning of a “new internationalism” in which war between nation-
states would be rendered obsolete as a mechanism for the resolution 
of international disputes.106 A century of relative peace seemed to 
have brought forth a new system of relations among states, 
symbolized by the Hague Conferences. In the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, internationalists saw the progressive substitution of “the 
empire of law” for the anarchy of state rivalries.107 And with the 
example of the Hague Conferences before them, American 
internationalists found themselves involved in an increasingly heady 
new conversation about what Nicholas Murray Butler—following the 
European lawyers’ esprit d’internationalité—began to call “the 
international mind.”108 As early as 1889 and 1890, Secretary of State 
James Blaine had described an agreement to arbitrate disputes 
among western hemisphere nation-states as the new “Magna Charta” 
of international peace.109 President McKinley announced at his 
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inauguration in 1897 that the “importance and moral influence” of 
arbitration among states could “hardly be overestimated in the cause 
of advancing civilization.”110 Indeed, other commentators suggested 
that arbitrations of nation-state disputes would complete the process 
of “substituting law for war,”111 vindicate the possibility of a “spiritual 
evolution for mankind,”112 and give life to an “all-embracing” idea of 
“brotherly love” and a “bond of union transcending national, racial or 
color lines.”113 International arbitrations would give rise to “nothing 
less than a court of the nations” to decide disputes among peoples 
“according to eternal principles of law and equity,” argued President 
William Howard Taft.114 “Never before,” announced an advocate of 
the “new internationalism,” had “there been such a universal 
revulsion against force as a means of settling international 
quarrels.”115 War, Andrew Carnegie declared upon the formation of 
his Endowment for International Peace, had been “discarded as 
disgraceful to civilized men,” much as dueling and slavery had been 
discarded in the century before.116 The “glorious example of reason 
and peace,” President William McKinley explained, would at last 
triumph over “passion and war.”117 And, as leading American 
international lawyers like Elihu Root observed again and again, the 
United States—as the world’s greatest and freest republic—seemed to 
have an unequaled “power and influence” in this “new era of the law 
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of nations” to bring about “peace and justice” and “human 
brotherhood the world over.”118 
Yet there were actually at least two distinct internationalisms at 
work in early-twentieth-century American thinking. Many elite 
international lawyers—and preeminently Elihu Root—took up the 
orthodox version of American internationalism. As secretary of war 
in the McKinley administration and then secretary of state under 
President Theodore Roosevelt, Root helped to craft the United 
States’s renewed engagement with the world after a century of 
relative isolation. He shaped U.S. authority and defended U.S. 
interests in Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico after the Spanish-
American War. In 1907, he cosponsored a Central American Peace 
Conference that established the Central American Court of Justice. 
And in that same year he orchestrated American involvement in the 
Second Hague Conference. Indeed, for his efforts as secretary of state 
and as a U.S. senator thereafter, and for his work as the president of 
both the American Society of International Law and the Carnegie 
Endowment, Root was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1912.119 
Root viewed nation-state sovereignty as the foundational 
building block of international law. The law of nations, in Root’s 
orthodox view, was organized around the practices and agreements of 
sovereign states. “The independence of nations,” Root wrote in his 
Nobel Prize address of 1912, “lies at the basis of the present social 
organization of the civilized world.”120 As “between two mutually 
exclusive sovereignties,” he had explained three years earlier in a 
presidential address to the American Society for International Law, 
“each is supreme and subject to no compulsion on its own side of the 
line.”121 The world was therefore ready neither for a “parliament of 
man with authority to control the conduct of nations,” nor for “an 
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international police force with power to enforce national conformity 
to rules of right conduct.”122 Instead, people and organizations seeking 
to work for world peace, Root contended, were best advised to “stand 
behind the men who are in the responsible positions of 
government.”123 
If truth be told, even Root’s nineteenth-century orthodoxy made 
room for international constraints on the sovereignty of nation-states. 
In Root’s account, international law assumed the consent of all states 
to a minimal baseline standard of conduct. Nations “in the exercise of 
their individual sovereignty” were required to conform to “a standard 
of international conduct” deduced from the “universal postulate” that 
“every sovereign nation is willing at all times and under all 
circumstances to do what is just.”124 Like a Lockean social contract 
writ global, the implied consent of nation-states to this baseline 
standard created theoretical constraints on the sovereignty of states 
even under Root’s orthodox approach to the law of nations. 
A second strand of American internationalism, however, focused 
much more explicitly on creating international constraints on the 
nation-state. “[T]o trust . . . traditional political ‘organization’ to 
create peaceful relations between nations,” argued advocates of this 
second strand of internationalism, inevitably involved “reliance 
upon” precisely the “exaggerated nationalistic and power politics” 
that had caused crises between rival powers in the first place.125 
Radical internationalists like John Dewey and Jane Addams thus 
sought to move beyond the building blocks of nation-states to new 
international structures.  
As Dewey’s inclusion in the ranks of the radical internationalists 
suggests, this second approach to internationalism brought to bear the 
skeptical force of pragmatic thinking on the concept of the nation-
state. Jane Addams warned that “nationalistic words” and “patriotic 
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WITT FINAL.DOC 8/12/2005 10:49 AM 
732 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:705 
phrases” were “abstractions” with dangerous power.126 Disputes 
among nations, she argued, were like international conventions for 
railroads, telegraphs, and commercial paper. They required solutions 
that “transcended national boundaries” and they could not be solved 
“while men’s minds were still held apart” by the “national suspicions 
and rivalries” that nation-states so often generated.127 It was those 
suspicions and rivalries that made the legal fiction of nation-states—
“artificial unit[s] of loyalty,” as Max Eastman put it—so dangerous.128 
Indeed, nation-state rivalries, argued Addams’s colleague Norman 
Thomas, ensured that no nation could prepare to defend itself 
without “awaken[ing] suspicion” among its neighbors, who would be 
forced to “keep up a race in armaments” that would lead to regular 
“nationalistic struggles.”129 What the radical internationalists like 
Addams offered instead, Max Eastman contended in 1916, was a 
world in which humanity would break the cycle of competitive 
rivalries to join together in “international union.”130 War, he urged, 
might thus be eliminated “exactly as the wars of family and clan and 
city” had been “eliminated by national union.”131 
As World War I approached, Crystal Eastman joined the 
increasingly vocal cadre of radical internationalists who argued that 
nationalism (though only recently a positive force for the self-
determination of peoples) had become a Trojan horse for militaristic 
arms races among European powers. There were, to be sure, a variety 
of different approaches even within the radical wing of American 
internationalism. Norman Thomas held a Christian-pacifist 
“internationalism based on the universal brotherhood of the children 
of God.”132 Others came to internationalism from the perspective of 
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socialist and communist critiques of the state.133 Still others were 
latter-day James Madisons, seeing in the relationships among states in 
the American federal system a principle that might be extended to 
nation-states in a transnational system.134 Some radical 
internationalists, like one American conscientious objector in August 
1917, claimed simply that “internationalism” was their “only 
principle.”135 What this eclectic array of radical internationalisms 
agreed upon, however, was that nationalism all too often and all too 
easily gave way to militarism, an especially virulent form of 
nationalism. Militarism was “the aggressive spirit and unfriendly 
point of view toward other nations,” which created “parochial 
hostility,” “national aggression,” and a “national psychology of fear,” 
all of which led “inevitably . . . to conflict.”136 In its place, Eastman 
and the radical internationalists advanced a conception of 
cosmopolitan democracy as the “mutual recognition of the rights of 
other men, irrespective of creed, color or national boundaries.”137 
Their internationalist aim was thus to create transnational institutions 
that would contain the threat of militarism by eclipsing the ostensibly 
unquestioned authority of nation-states in the orthodox nineteenth-
century view of international law. 
Between August 1914 and March 1917, Eastman became perhaps 
the leading organizer of the radical internationalist movement in the 
United States. By early 1916, she was serving as the executive 
secretary of the American Union Against Militarism and as the chair 
of the active New York City branch of the Woman’s Peace Party. 
Both organizations adopted the positions of the radical 
internationalists, opposing the militarism of nation-state rivalries and 
supporting a world federation to transcend them. The Peace Party 
sought to serve as a worldwide “clearing-house” for internationalist 
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ideas during the war.138 It urged the democratization of foreign policy, 
the abrogation of secret treaties, and the nationalization of arms 
manufacture to remove commercial incentives to the whipping-up of 
nationalist fervor.139 The American Union, in turn, pursued a nearly 
identical program to “work against militarism” and to build “toward 
world federation, which alone would make disarmament possible, and 
which alone could really root out militarism.”140 
The American Union developed into America’s most important 
radical internationalist organization, with Eastman (in Lillian Wald’s 
words) as its “wonderful secretary.”141 Eastman worked to ensure that 
all of the “energy and genius” of the American Union would “be 
directed toward putting this idea of a world federation into workable 
form, acceptable to all nations.”142 As she conceived it, the American 
Union’s aim was to “keep the ideal of internationalism alive and 
growing in the minds and hearts of the American people.”143 Indeed, 
the organization’s international program was lifted almost directly 
from the eclectic (and often not altogether consistent) array of ideas 
that American and European internationalists had bandied about for 
decades: self-determination; equal treatment for all nations; a 
“Society of Nations” developed through the Hague Conference; a 
“permanent Court of International Justice” to strengthen the existing 
Hague Court of Arbitration; reductions in armaments; the voiding of 
secret treaties; and the removal of restraints on international trade. 
Members of the American Union protested the war’s diversion of 
public attention away from “World Peace based on International 
Agreement”144 and called for a “democratic federation of American 
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republics as a step toward international government.”145 They 
testified, as Eastman did before Congress in January 1916, against the 
creeping militarism that had created a dangerous arms race. And they 
urged President Wilson to take up the so-called Hensley Resolution 
in the Naval Appropriation Act of 1916, which authorized him to 
convene a Conference of Nations for disarmament. Eastman and her 
colleagues advocated policies that they believed would move the 
world toward what Eastman described to Congress as 
“unnationalism”: a “federation of nations” dedicated to “democracy, 
to peace, and to their mutual good will and friendship.”146 
Of course, the radical internationalists’ ideas were often utopian 
and impractical. But they were no more so than many of the ideas 
that had been spinning out of internationalist conversations on both 
sides of the Atlantic for decades. Radical internationalism was a 
continuation of international lawyers’ esprit d’internationalité. Indeed, 
the radicals of 1914 to 1917 drew their inspiration from virtually the 
same set of developments that had sent international lawyers into 
flights of fantastic rhetoric for the previous half-century. Like 
international lawyers since the 1870s, Crystal Eastman’s Woman’s 
Peace Party of New York City pointed to the development of the 
Universal Postal Union and the International Telegraphic Union and 
to the proliferation of international commercial associations such as 
the International Congress of Chambers of Commerce. Such 
institutions, Eastman and her colleagues contended, were harbingers 
of a coming internationalism. The world, it seemed, was growing 
smaller. According to orthodox and radical internationalists alike, it 
was “already in large measure internationalized.”147 And like Andrew 
Carnegie just a few years before, Eastman and her colleagues cited 
the international condemnation of slavery in the nineteenth century 
as demonstration of the moral progress that international action 
could achieve in the newly close quarters of the twentieth.148 
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Yet the same questions of nation-state sovereignty and of the 
citizen’s obligations to work through official state channels that 
divided orthodox internationalists from radicals reappeared within 
organizations like the Woman’s Peace Party and the American 
Union. In the latter organization, for example, leading members such 
as Lillian Wald and Paul Kellogg believed strongly in working 
through the instrumentalities of the national government to advance 
their internationalist aims. Congressional hearings, “personal work 
with congressmen,”149 and discrete advocacy with President Wilson 
and his Secretary of War Newton Baker were their preferred methods 
of action. The American Union therefore pursued a campaign of 
private advocacy and personal meetings with Wilson, Baker, and 
others in the Wilson administration into early 1917.150 
Eastman, by contrast, represented the radical wing of even the 
nation-state skeptics in the internationalist movement. Friendly critics 
such as Wald suggested that Eastman was overly enamored of an 
“impulsive radicalism.”151 (Members of the Peace Party quietly 
warned that she was too radical to “greatly help the movement.”152) 
Eastman’s more confrontational tactics included propaganda 
campaigns, national speaking tours, and mass meetings. In the spring 
of 1916, she organized a public exhibit that included Jingo the 
Dinosaur (“All Armor Plate—No Brains,” announced the collar on 
the papier-mâché caricature of militarist nationalism), whose 
aggressive personality and tiny brain had led to its own extinction. A 
speaking tour through the Midwest followed, reaching an estimated 
forty thousand listeners. By May, Eastman had collected the names of 
five thousand supporters and distributed over six hundred thousand 
“pieces of propaganda.”153 Internationalism, she insisted, was a 
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movement to be pursued by “the people acting directly—not through 
their governments or diplomats or armies.”154 
Internationally minded women like Eastman had good reason to 
adopt a stance of skepticism toward the official channels of the 
nation-state. As woman’s movements across Europe and in the 
United States had observed throughout the nineteenth century, states 
had long excluded them from full membership. Annis Ford Eastman, 
for one, had noted years before that women (and especially married 
women) had at best a complicated relationship to the conventional 
categories of nation-state citizenship. Nation-states, she observed, had 
regularly disabled women from service as soldier, property owner, 
voter, officer of the court, or public official.155 Indeed, in 1916, Crystal 
Eastman encountered firsthand the liminal status of women in the 
modern nation-state when she divorced Bennie and married Walter 
Fuller, a British citizen whom she had met through their joint 
involvement in the early stages of the American Union. By virtue of a 
law enacted by Congress in 1907156 and upheld by the Supreme Court 
in the year before Eastman’s marriage,157 American women 
automatically took the nationality of their husbands. As a result, 
Eastman herself—though still living in the United States—was 
stripped of her U.S. citizenship when she married Walter Fuller. It 
should hardly be surprising, then, that many women adopted 
confrontational tactics—publicity, mass meetings, and direct action by 
the people—that skirted the official channels of the state. The state, 
after all, had made it exceedingly difficult for women to act through 
those official channels. And just as many American women in the 
1910s—Eastman included—were being drawn to the radical tactics of 
the British suffragettes, so too were they drawn to such tactics in the 
internationalist campaign against militarist nationalism.158 
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For Eastman and many other women in internationalist circles, 
women’s persistent second-class citizenship highlighted the dangers of 
the nation-state and its nationalist symbols. In Four Lights, the 
magazine of the Woman’s Peace Party of New York City, Eastman 
and her colleagues attacked the nation-state as a kind of artificial 
superstition. “Long ago,” wrote one Four Lights author, “we drew 
‘imaginary’ lines over our globe . . . we put deep-printed lines over 
latitudes and longitudes, believing that lines can separate the nations 
of the earth.”159 Over time, those imaginary lines had hardened into 
divisions among peoples, “conceiving those across our crooked lines 
as hostages, enemies, or at best, remote and unlike peoples.”160 The 
“foolish little boundaries” of imaginary maps, however, were now 
under attack from a band of “Internationalists” who were “as 
disturbing to your nationalistic Flatlander as the witches to Salem.”161 
On the internationalist view, Four Lights contended, the “boundary 
lines of nations are as imaginary as the equatorial line”; the people on 
the other side were “neighbors and friends instead of strangers and 
enemies.”162 Indeed, the internationalist agenda, as Eastman and the 
Four Lights editors of the Women’s Peace Party of New York City 
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conceived it, was no less than “to destroy geography” by “welding the 
nations of the world into the United States of the World.”163 
What women-led antiwar organizations had done was to sharpen 
two decades’ worth of growing skepticism about a nineteenth-century 
abstraction. But it was not skepticism about the abstraction of rights. 
It was instead skepticism about that other great nineteenth-century 
legal abstraction: the sovereignty of nation-states, which in 
internationalist circles had already come to seem little more than an 
abstract “relic from an earlier era,” as international lawyer Louis 
Henkin would later describe it, made up of “fictions upon fictions.”164 
Here was one of the most dangerous of “a priori truths,” in Addams’s 
words, a fiction that inspired “violent loyalty” and caused “men in a 
nation, an army, a crowd” to do things “horrible as well as heroic that 
they could never do alone.”165 The nation had become a kind of 
“metaphysical entity,” complained Norman Thomas, “apart from the 
individuals who compose it.”166 Rights might have been a nineteenth-
century idea newly vulnerable in an era of war and pragmatism, but 
so too was the sovereignty of states. As Germany resumed 
unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917, conditions in the 
United States were right for a collision between the obligations of 
loyalty exacted by the nation-state, on one hand, and internationalist 
ideals of cosmopolitan citizenship, on the other. That collision would 
initiate the twentieth-century civil liberties movement. 
III.  INTERNATIONALISM AND THE 
BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN “CIVIL LIBERTIES” 
It was one thing to question the form of the nation-state in 1916, 
to describe it as a dangerous legal fiction, and to call for its eclipse by 
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new systems of international governance. But once the United States 
entered the war in April 1917, questions about citizens’ obligations to 
the state were no longer merely theoretical. Among U.S. 
internationalists, intervention in the war thus touched off a scramble 
for a secure position between loyalty and internationalism. “After 
war was declared, we of course ceased all opposition to it,” explained 
one member of the American Union.167 At the Woman’s Peace Party, 
the reaction was the same: “All the activities of the Woman’s Peace 
Party have been, of course, modified by the entrance . . . into the 
World War.”168 And as far as Crystal Eastman’s long-time friend Paul 
Kellogg was concerned, he favored “not blocking the prosecution of 
war, now that the decision has been made.”169 For many, the loyalty 
obligations of the nation-state thus seemed to trump the 
internationalist agenda. In the words of Elihu Root, “the question of 
peace or war” had “now been decided by the President and 
congress.”170 “The question no longer remains open,” Root concluded, 
and it had become the duty of American citizens “to stop discussion 
upon the question decided” lest criticism weaken the power of the 
nation to “succeed in the war upon which” it had entered.171 As 
William R. Vance, dean of the University of Minnesota Law School, 
summed up in 1917, “[W]artime was no time to quibble about 
constitutional rights and guarantees.”172 Indeed, the mere 
“suggestion” of opposition to conscription—a position that had 
formed one of the American Union’s deepest commitments—now 
seemed to many Americans no different than “treason,” and its 
advocates “traitors” to “be dealt with accordingly.”173 
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Whether the American Union would be able to identify an 
intermediate position between loyalty and internationalism seemed to 
turn in large part on the Wilson administration’s wartime stance 
toward the radical internationalists. As a rhetorical matter, at least, 
Wilson often allied himself with radical internationalists such as 
Addams and Eastman. As far back as the 1880s, Wilson had 
tentatively endorsed the idea that the world was witnessing a gradual 
evolution toward “confederation” among states on the model of the 
United States. He taught international law at Princeton in 1892. In 
1908 he joined the American Peace Society.174 And once war broke 
out in 1914, he appealed to Americans to remain “neutral in fact as 
well as in name,” while privately endorsing the idea of “an association 
of nations” and opening a dialogue with peace organizations such as 
the Carnegie Endowment and the League to Enforce Peace.175 In 
1916, Wilson privately assured a delegation from the American Union 
that he was working toward a “joint effort” on a global scale to “keep 
the peace”; two months later, he came out publicly in favor of the 
principle of a “League of Peace” by which the “nations of the world” 
would “band themselves together to see that . . . right prevails.”176 In 
his famous “Fourteen Points” speech to the Senate in January 1917, 
he called again for an international “concert of power which will 
make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever 
overwhelm us again.”177  
In these respects, at least, Wilson’s vision for a postwar order 
often looked remarkably like that of internationalists in the American 
Union. To allow nationalistic ambitions to shape the peace, Wilson 
seemed to believe, would merely ensure the resurgence of the 
national rivalries that had caused it in the first place. Instead, Wilson 
urged a peace based on the “equality of rights” among nations, “free 
access” for all nations to the seas and to international commerce, and 
the “limitation of armies” and of “military preparation.”178 Moreover, 
many of his public addresses seemed (like Eastman’s antimilitarist 
 
 174. HARLEY NOTTER, THE ORIGINS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF WOODROW WILSON 264 
(1937).  
 175. JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., THE WARRIOR AND THE PRIEST: WOODROW WILSON 
AND THEODORE ROOSEVELT 273, 275 (1983); see RUHL J. BARTLETT, THE LEAGUE TO 
ENFORCE PEACE 34 (1944). 
 176. 37 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 115 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1981); see 36 id. at 645 
(1981). 
 177. 40 id. at 534 (1982).  
 178. 36 id. at 645 (1981).  
WITT FINAL.DOC 8/12/2005 10:49 AM 
742 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:705 
tactics) to skirt the official channels of nation-state diplomacy. Wilson 
spoke eloquently of reaching “the peoples of Europe over the heads 
of their Rulers”;179 as he told one correspondent, his “Peace Without 
Victory” speech was addressed not to the Senate, nor even to 
“foreign governments,” but to “the people of the countries now at 
war.”180 Wilson, in short, seemed to have embraced the hopeful 
idealism of the prewar internationalist spirit. Leaders of the 
American Union and the Woman’s Peace Party thus saw in Wilson’s 
bold internationalist rhetoric of 1916 and 1917 their own aspirations 
for postwar international order. Even as late as the beginning of 1918, 
for example, Crystal Eastman and her brother Max supported the 
president, endorsing “his demand for an international union, based 
upon free seas, free commerce and general disarmament.”181 
In practice, however, Wilson proved to be an ardent believer in 
Root’s orthodox approach to the relationship between states and 
individuals in the law of nations. Wilson claimed that the United 
States had entered the war to pursue the “vindication of right, of 
human right,” and the “rights of mankind.”182 But those rights were to 
be advanced on the international stage by vindicating the rights not of 
individuals but of sovereign nation-states. “We shall be satisfied,” 
Wilson told the assembled joint session of Congress, when human 
rights “have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of 
nations can make them.”183 In the final analysis, Wilson’s 
internationalism aimed to ensure the “rights and liberties” of “nations 
great and small,” and in particular “the most sacred rights of our 
nation.”184 His “concert of free peoples” was just that—an association 
of peoples organized in nation-states for the purpose of bringing 
“peace and safety to all nations.”185 And when the war came to the 
United States, Wilson became a powerful (if occasionally reluctant) 
believer in the overriding power of citizens’ obligations of loyalty to 
the state. War, he warned Frank Cobb of the New York World in 
 
 179. KNOCK, supra note 154, at 162; see Laurence W. Martin, Woodrow Wilson’s Appeals to 
the People of Europe, 74 POL. SCI. Q. 498, 499 (1959).  
 180.  41 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 176, at 55; see KNOCK, supra note 
154, at 114–15. 
 181. CRYSTAL EASTMAN, Editorial, in CRYSTAL EASTMAN ON WOMEN & REVOLUTION, 
supra note 21, at 291; see KNOCK, supra note 154, at 11–12.  
 182. 41 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 176, at 520–26 (1983).  
 183. 41 id. at 525 (emphasis added).  
 184. 41 id. at 521 (emphases added). 
 185. 41 id. at 527 (emphasis added). 
 WITT FINAL.DOC 8/12/2005 10:49 AM 
2004] INTERNATIONALISM & CIVIL LIBERTIES 743 
March 1917, would require “illiberalism at home to reinforce the men 
at the front.”186 “The Constitution,” Wilson continued, “would not 
survive” a war, and “free speech and the right of assembly would go,” 
too.187 By May 1917, merely a month after American entry into the 
war, Wilson had already begun to shut down the conversations that 
he had helped to start about the shape of postwar internationalism. 
Such conversations, he warned, were “very unwise” while the war was 
still pending.188 
With the Wilson administration’s approval and encouragement, 
state and federal governments alike enacted new legislation to 
enforce the loyalty to the nation required of citizens. In February 
1917, Congress had debated legislation to punish those who 
intentionally caused disaffection in the armed forces or who 
intentionally interfered in military operations.189 With the declaration 
of war on April 6, such legislation became a virtual certainty. 
Congress authorized selective conscription, which Wilson put into 
effect by requiring the registration of all men between the ages of 
twenty-one and thirty.190 The Espionage Act, enacted June 15, 
authorized criminal prosecution of spies and of anyone who 
obstructed recruitment or enlistment or who caused or attempted to 
cause insubordination or disloyalty in military or naval forces.191 
Materials violating the Espionage Act or otherwise “urging treason” 
were “declared to be nonmailable matter” not to be delivered by the 
postmaster general.192 The Trading with the Enemy Act limited 
commerce and communication with enemies of the United States.193 
Amendments to the Espionage Act in May 1918 prohibited disloyal 
or abusive language about “the form of government of the United 
States,” or about its flag, uniforms, or military or naval forces.194 From 
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Montana and Texas to Minnesota and Nebraska, similar 
developments produced dozens of new laws at the state and 
municipal levels banning expressions of opposition to the war.195 
Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson and Attorney General 
Thomas Gregory enforced the new legislation with an enthusiastic 
abandon that the New York World called “an intellectual reign of 
terror in the United States.”196 “May God have mercy” on dissenters 
from the nation’s war plans, thundered Gregory, “for they need 
expect none from an outraged people and an avenging 
government.”197 Between 1917 and the end of 1921, the federal 
government would commence more than two thousand prosecutions 
under the Espionage Act. Burleson shut down dozens of foreign 
language newspapers pursuant to authority granted him under the 
Trading with the Enemy Act. Newspapers such as the conservative 
socialist Milwaukee Leader were denied mailing privileges, as were 
seventy-four other newspapers by the fall of 1918. Even the eminently 
respectable Nation was barred from the mails on Burleson’s order 
until Wilson intervened.198 The August 1917 issue of Max Eastman’s 
avant-garde journal the Masses was declared nonmailable by 
Burleson and Gregory for its antiwar cartoons and its opposition to 
the draft. After an order by U.S. District Judge Learned Hand 
requiring Burleson to mail the issue was stayed and overturned by the 
Court of Appeals, Burleson revoked the Masses’ second-class mailing 
privileges altogether for having missed an issue and thus having failed 
to remain a “periodical” within the meaning of the second-class mail 
law.199 
Private and quasi-private patriotism was often as powerful a 
force as the authority of the state. Ad hoc vigilante gangs and 
ultranationalist patriots—organizations like the American Defense 
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Society, the American Protective League, the National Liberty 
League, the Liberty League, the Knights of Liberty, the American 
Rights League, and the Boy Spies of America—smashed antiwar 
demonstrations, interrupted pacifist speaking halls, and lynched men 
suspected of pro-German leanings.200 The more respectable National 
Security League held events urging national loyalty and condemning 
those whom former President Theodore Roosevelt called “weaklings, 
illusionists, materialists, lukewarm Americans and faddists of all the 
types that vitiate sound nationalism.”201 National Security League 
addresses were supplemented by the thousands of speakers (“Four 
Minute Men,” as they were known) who operated out of the federal 
government’s Committee on Public Information (CPI). Headed by 
former journalist George Creel, the CPI spearheaded a massive 
propaganda campaign in the form of an extraordinary seventy-five 
million pamphlets and as many as six thousand press releases, 
virtually all broadcasting the importance of national loyalty in time of 
war.202 As one Security League speaker summed up the message of 
the patriotic campaign of 1917, the nationalist view was that 
“citizenship means everything or nothing.”203 Loyal citizens “should 
refrain from fractious criticism,” speakers cautioned, and should 
openly display their support for the war effort lest they be mistaken 
for “unconditional traitors” who hid treasonous attitudes beneath an 
outward display of silence.204 In the new wartime atmosphere, those 
whom Roosevelt and his nationalist allies scorned as “professional 
internationalists” were most at risk.205 Treasury Secretary William 
McAdoo declared in October 1917 that advocacy of internationalism 
during wartime was, “in effect, traitorous.”206 Others expressed the 
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same sentiment in less civilized fashion, scrawling slogans like 
“Treason’s Twilight Zone” on the doors to the American Union’s 
offices.207 
For Crystal Eastman and her American Union colleagues, the 
wartime atmosphere of mandatory loyalty to the nation-state made it 
extraordinarily important to determine “the logical, courageous, and 
at the same time law abiding” role for internationalists.208 “Extreme 
patriots would force us to go out of business,” she observed, yet 
“extremists of another sort” would surely put them all “in the federal 
penitentiary.”209 Many items on the American Union’s prewar agenda 
were now “impracticable,” opposition to the war not the least among 
them.210 As the spring of 1917 wore on, however, a new role seemed 
increasingly available. President Wilson had “turned his back on civil 
liberties,” as historian John Blum has argued, “because he loved his 
vision of eventual peace more.”211 But if Eastman’s wing of American 
internationalism was right about the drift toward militarist 
nationalism, nongovernmental organizations like the American 
Union would have to be able to articulate views other than those 
approved by the state. The very conversation about postwar 
internationalism that Wilson had started would have to be continued, 
whether Wilson approved of it or not. Yet if radical antimilitarists 
were to carry on their advocacy of a new internationalism to replace 
the nation-state, they would have to establish some kind of protection 
from the very authority they sought to displace.  
In the spring of 1917, civil liberties emerged as the solution to the 
dilemma of the internationalists in wartime. Civil liberties provided 
the position between jingoist patriotism and treasonous 
internationalism for which the American Union had been searching. 
As American Union member John Haynes Holmes would later 
remember, American entry into the war meant that disarmament and 
attendant internationalist goals were, “for the time being at least,” a 
“lost cause.” “But lo,” he continued, “as though to engage our liberal 
efforts afresh, there came suddenly to the fore in our nation’s life the 
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new issue of civil liberties.”212 Already in April 1917, the American 
Union called for an “immediate anti-conscription campaign” and 
“cooperation in the defense of free speech and free assembly during 
the war.”213 Americans might no longer safely argue against the war 
effort, but they could surely work “to prevent and oppose all those 
extreme manifestations of militarism” that seemed certain to follow in 
war’s wake: “the brutal treatment” of the conscientious objector, “the 
denial of free speech,” and “the suppressing of minority press.”214 The 
resolution of the internationalists’ crisis, in short, was to fight “the 
general abrogation of civil liberty” that the war among nation-states 
had brought in its wake.215 Indeed, such work, American Union 
leaders argued, was “the logical consequence of what we have been 
doing for two years.”216 As Eastman urged, the defense of 
conscientious objectors and the protection of civil liberties had a 
“natural and logical place in the progress of our activities.”217 The 
American Union, in her view, was the “logical group to defend the 
other American liberties, free speech, free press and free assembly.”218 
As the organization put it in a press release in the fall of 1917, a 
“Union Against Militarism becomes, during war time, inevitably a 
Union for the Defense of Civil Liberty.”219 In late June 1917, the 
Conscientious Objectors’ Bureau of the American Union, which had 
tentatively been formed two months earlier, was remade into the 
“Civil Liberties Bureau.”220 Within weeks, “civil liberties” had 
become the “chief war work” of the nation’s leading radical-
internationalist organization.221 
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The name of the new Civil Liberties Bureau emerged out of the 
same transatlantic internationalism from which the American Union 
had arisen. Though the term “civil liberty” had long been central to 
Anglo-American law and political theory, eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century lawyers and political writers only sparingly and 
erratically employed its disaggregated form, the plural “civil 
liberties.” The phrase had been popularized just a year earlier by the 
British National Council for Civil Liberties.222 Walter Fuller, 
Eastman’s new husband, was closely connected to the British 
organization (he would later become its corresponding secretary). 
With the establishment of the Civil Liberties Bureau, the American 
Union adopted the National Council’s coinage as its own. Roger 
Baldwin, the recent addition to the American Union staff who 
headed-up the new Civil Liberties Bureau, would later recall that the 
Bureau’s name represented “the first time that the phrase ‘civil 
liberties’ had been so used in the United States.”223  
The phrase seemed well-tailored for inveterate rights-skeptics 
such as Eastman. The term “civil liberties” promised to break down 
the abstraction of “civil liberty” into its specific and concrete 
component parts – “free speech, free press and free assembly,” as 
Eastman put it. Indeed, the phrase accomplished for the American 
Union what influential legal theorists of the same generation sought 
to do for legal thought. Early legal realists such as Yale Law School’s 
Wesley Hohfeld argued that nineteenth-century juristic abstractions 
such as “liberty” had contributed to dangerously sloppy modes of 
legal reasoning. Legal slogans such as “right,” “property,” and 
“liberty,” Hohfeld insisted, contained a multitude of discrete legal 
relations. Those relations, in turn, were best understood in 
disaggregated terms, not in the language of conceptual deduction and 
abstract principle.224 By the same token, disaggregated “civil liberties” 
claims seemed well-designed to mediate the tensions that rights-
claims posed for those in radical internationalist circles who had been 
critical of rights-based thinking only a few short years before. Civil 
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liberties would be “civil liberty” for a Hohfeldian age of pragmatic 
skepticism about legal abstractions. 
Most importantly, for Eastman the civil liberties initiative 
represented not a new set of rights-based ends, but rather a 
continuation by other means of the American Union’s pre-war 
internationalist agenda. Now that war had materialized, the defense 
of civil liberties seemed a necessary precondition to the advancement 
of internationalism. Norman Thomas argued that “the country which 
[suppresses civil liberties] will never commend democracy to the 
world.”225 Eastman further contended that all nations needed to “be 
democratized before a federated world can be achieved.”226 At the 
very least, it seemed clear, as a small but growing number of people 
ranging from the members of the Woman’s Peace Party of New York 
City to Senator Joseph I. France of Maryland noted, that “full free 
and continuous discussion” of matters of great public import—the 
nation’s war aims, peace terms, and treaty negotiations—required 
“freedom of the press” and “freedom of speech.”227 
Early efforts in the Civil Liberties Bureau thus adopted civil 
liberties as a strategic tool for the advancement of internationalism.228 
The Bureau’s earliest efforts were often not authentic expressions of 
a commitment to the virtues of the Bill of Rights, but means to 
internationalist ends. Roger Baldwin of the American Union put it 
most cynically when he instructed a colleague “to get a good lot of 
flags” and “talk a good deal about the Constitution.”229 Baldwin’s 
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instrumentalism was perhaps more cynical than most. But his 
strategic appropriation of constitutional rights as symbols of 
American nationalism captured the spirit of the organization’s turn to 
civil liberties in 1917. The American Union had advocated 
international institutions for years precisely because those institutions 
seemed better able than nation-states to secure human freedom and 
democracy. In 1917 the organization’s members found themselves 
compelled by the circumstances of the war to make those claims in 
new “civil liberties” terms, but the aims remained the same. 
During the summer and fall of 1917, Eastman worked alongside 
Roger Baldwin in the American Union’s civil liberties activities. As 
Baldwin would later recall, Eastman had been his “first associate in 
World War I days.”230 Together, they defended conscientious 
objectors and antiwar agitators. Eastman even developed an 
ambitious plan of test cases to try the “actual testing of the right of 
free speech” in those places in which it had been limited.231 And yet 
Baldwin emerged as the leader of the Civil Liberties Bureau. It was a 
development that had significant implications for the internationalist 
agenda and the fledgling civil liberties movement.  
IV.  CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE ECLIPSE OF INTERNATIONALISM 
Eastman had missed the beginnings of the American Union’s 
wartime move to civil liberties. On March 19, 1917, she gave birth to 
her first child, Jeffrey Fuller. The birth appears to have had lasting 
effects on Eastman’s health. She had always been susceptible to 
sickness. When Eastman was three, she and her older brother Morgan 
contracted scarlet fever. Morgan died, and though Crystal survived, 
she regularly suffered debilitating illnesses thereafter.232 In 1911, she 
was forced to break off her engagement with the New York state 
employers’ liability commission because of illness.233 In April 1916, 
she became ill during the American Union’s Truth About 
Preparedness Tour, and was ordered “kept strictly in bed” for several 
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weeks.234 With Jeffrey’s birth, Eastman developed a “chronic disease 
of her kidneys,” as Max later described it, that would plague her until 
her death.235 By March 1921, she would be forced to resign from the 
executive committee of the Civil Liberties Bureau’s successor, the 
American Civil Liberties Union. “I have always been too tired,” 
explained the otherwise energetic Eastman.236 She would die just 
seven years later, in 1928. 
Eastman’s complicated pregnancy forced her to take off more 
than two months beginning in mid-March 1917. They were a critical 
two months, spanning the beginning of American involvement in the 
war, and Eastman knew it. “I am crazy to get back on the job,” she 
wrote shortly after Jeffrey’s birth.237 There would be, she feared, 
“nothing left for me to do” by the time she got back.238 Most 
troublingly, Eastman feared that in her absence the American Union 
would turn away from its radical-internationalist agenda. Baldwin, in 
particular, had suggested a new direction for the group that Eastman 
found wanting “in a great many respects.”239 She had hoped to meet 
with Baldwin before giving birth to Jeffrey and going to Atlantic City 
to convalesce, but Walter and her physician insisted that she not.240 
During Eastman’s absence, which continued into early June 
1917, Baldwin had indeed begun to establish himself as the new force 
in the American Union. His extraordinary energies matched 
Eastman’s. Like Eastman, he had begun his career as a sociologically 
informed architect of the modern administrative state. After 
graduation from Harvard College, he had gone to St. Louis to found 
the sociology department of Washington University and to run a 
neighborhood settlement house. While in St. Louis, Baldwin also 
became actively involved in the reform of the city’s criminal courts. 
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What workmen’s compensation had been to Eastman, the new 
juvenile courts and probation systems were to Baldwin: socialized 
systems for modernizing nineteenth-century law. Like workmen’s 
compensation programs, juvenile courts aimed to replace 
cumbersome inquiries into individual rights and moral culpability 
with regimes of social-scientific expertise designed to treat social 
problems and manage populations.241 Expert “professional 
standards,” in Baldwin’s words, would replace traditional 
adjudication, which Baldwin had come to think of as simply “judicial 
interference.”242 While Eastman was counting injured workers in 
Pittsburgh, Baldwin helped to found the National Probation Officers’ 
Association. A few years later, he coauthored what would quickly 
become a leading text in the field of juvenile justice.243  
Despite their similar backgrounds in progressive-era sociological 
reform, Baldwin and Eastman quickly developed an “uneasy” 
relationship to one another.244 For one thing, Baldwin’s Harvard 
education and inside connections in the Wilson administration made 
him both more inclined and better positioned than Eastman to 
engage in the kind of discreet advocacy with government officials that 
colleagues like Lillian Wald favored. Moreover, Baldwin came to the 
work of the American Union with an essentially domestic outlook. 
While Eastman toured Europe, met with international woman’s 
suffrage leaders, and encountered European radicals in the 
cosmopolitan setting of New York City, Baldwin had gone to the 
relatively insular St. Louis. His frame of reference in the area of civil 
liberties was therefore not, as Eastman’s had been, the 
internationalist outlook of the woman’s suffrage movement. Instead, 
Baldwin had developed the outlook of a domestic reformer, involved 
in such fights as the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People’s efforts to fight municipal housing segregation.245 To 
be sure, in his first months with the American Union, Baldwin 
supported its core internationalist agenda. And much later in life, 
Baldwin would become deeply involved in the United Nations’s work 
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for international human rights. “Nations,” he would suggest in the 
1970s, were “downright silly.” As Eastman had suggested sixty years 
earlier, Baldwin would contend that national boundaries were 
imaginary divisions of people into “geographical units” bounded by 
arbitrary lines and protected by armies.246 But in 1917, as Eastman had 
already begun to realize, Baldwin’s arrival served to exacerbate 
increasingly acute differences within the American Union over the 
question of internationalism. 
For a few months, tensions between Baldwin’s and Eastman’s 
theories of civil liberties took a back seat to a larger conflict that 
drove such figures as Lillian Wald and Paul Kellogg out of the 
American Union altogether. Wald and Kellogg had never been 
convinced that the civil liberties strategy offered a viable solution to 
the American Union’s wartime dilemmas. After the declaration of 
war, Wald and Kellogg—like Root and Wilson—believed strongly 
that the obligations of national citizenship required support for the 
war effort. The civil liberties campaign engineered by Baldwin and 
Eastman, in their view, veered too close to making the American 
Union “a party of opposition to the government.”247 Over the course 
of the summer, Wald and Kellogg struggled to bring the American 
Union around to Wald’s less confrontational approach. By 
September, however, Wald, Kellogg, and a number of others felt that 
they could not “remain if the active work for Civil Liberties is 
continued.”248 Eastman and others in the American Union insisted 
that the organization was not “embarking on a program of political 
obstruction”249 and merely working “against hysterical legislation, and 
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for peace.”250 But the subtleties of the distinction were lost on the 
disgruntled Wald-Kellogg wing of the American Union. By October 
1917, Wald and Kellogg had resigned.251 
Divergences between Baldwin and Eastman quickly resurfaced 
once the split within the American Union was complete. By the fall of 
1917, the prevailing atmosphere of mandatory patriotism made it 
virtually impossible for the Civil Liberties Bureau to advance 
Eastman’s brand of internationalism. After complaints from high-
ranking members of the military, Secretary of War Newton Baker cut 
off contact between the War Department and the Bureau in May 
1918. Three months later, the Department of Justice raided the 
Bureau’s offices and seized its papers.252 Courts began convening 
grand juries to investigate “foreigners” on soap boxes.253 Max 
Eastman was put on trial not once but twice during 1918 for his work 
on the Masses (the juries deadlocked both times).254 Baldwin himself 
was arrested for refusing to register for the draft, convicted, and 
sentenced to one year in prison.255  
Around the country, attitudes toward internationalists 
deteriorated still further. Herbert Bigelow, who had spoken on behalf 
of the American Union’s Truth About Preparedness Campaign in the 
spring of 1916, was kidnapped and brutalized in November 1917.256 
The Grand Rapids Press labeled the American Union and allied 
groups “seditious,”257 and the New York Tribune classed them as 
dangerous “enemies within.”258 By August 1918, Theodore Roosevelt 
was singling out “internationalists” as playing into the hands of 
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“German autocracy.”259 “Internationalism,” Elihu Root would soon 
announce, had become a threat to “the authority and responsibility of 
nations,” including the United States.260 
In the face of nationalist coercion, Baldwin led the Civil Liberties 
Bureau—now formally divorced from the American Union and 
renamed the National Civil Liberties Bureau—in what Norman 
Thomas called a “new direction” for civil liberties.261 The moral 
imperatives of nationalism had recast internationalism as treason. 
“[I]nternationalists and radical peace organizations,” explained 
Roger Baldwin to one supporter in September 1917, had come under 
tremendous pressure to purge “German names” from their lists of 
officials.262 Things became all the more dire after the November 1917 
Bolshevik revolution in Russia. “Worldwide Anarchist Plot” 
screamed headlines linking the “Bolsheviki” to the IWW and to 
“revolutionists” around the world.263 As the prosecutor at the 1918 
Espionage Act trial of Eugene Debs said in his closing argument to 
the jury, “Pitch all the nations into one pot with the Socialists on top 
and you’ve got internationalism.”264 By 1919, the federal government 
initiated deportations of suspected radicals back to Russia. The 
infamous Palmer Raids on suspected radicals quickly followed 
beginning in November of that year, as did the similar Lusk 
Committee Raids in New York State after them.265 By December 
1919, President Wilson, who had been a willing but unenthusiastic 
supporter of Burleson’s and Gregory’s enforcement actions during 
the war, was calling for a peacetime extension of the Espionage Act.266 
Even Lillian Wald, who had so carefully extricated herself in the 
summer of 1917 from the possible appearance of opposition to the 
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war effort, would find herself in 1919 still trying to defend her 
patriotism.267  
Between Baldwin’s domestic frame of reference and the 
extraordinary pressures being exerted against internationalism, it is 
hardly a wonder that the National Civil Liberties Bureau began to 
pull back from its internationalist beginnings. The great virtue of the 
civil liberties campaign as a wartime program was its ostensibly 
patriotic connections to the nation’s constitutive legal traditions. And 
with Baldwin’s leadership, the National Civil Liberties Bureau seized 
on those traditions to advance a conception of civil liberties 
increasingly stripped of internationalist trappings. Gone were the 
appeals to do away with the abstraction of the nation-state as a 
political form. Gone were the calls for civil liberties as both the 
necessary precondition for, and the purpose of, new structures of 
international governance. In their place, Baldwin substituted civil 
liberties claims couched in the language and traditions of American 
nationalism. Affiliates were urged to celebrate the 130th anniversary 
of the signing of the U.S. Constitution in September 1917.268 The 
Bureau’s challenges to the federal conscription regime, Baldwin 
assured, aimed not to obstruct the draft but merely to ensure that the 
first draft since the Civil War “not take place without the highest 
authority in the country passing upon it squarely.”269 Propaganda 
against the draft, Baldwin explained, would cease and be replaced by 
work narrowly confined to “the lines of legal defense.”270 “Let us be 
patriots in the true sense,” exclaimed a Bureau-affiliated lawyer from 
Chicago, perfectly capturing the newly bounded legal horizons of the 
Bureau.271 In the Bureau’s devotion to national ideals, a press release 
from the fall of 1917 declared, “[W]e believe ourselves to be patriots, 
no less sincere and earnest than those who lead our armies to 
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France.”272 The “cause of civil liberties,” Bureau leaders insisted, was 
“loyal” to the “American ideal” of freedom.273 Even Crystal Eastman 
took advantage of the opportunities afforded by patriotism: “[T]here 
is no more patriotic duty than to keep democracy alive at home,” she 
announced.274 Democracy, she concluded, meant the protection of 
“ancient American liberties.”275 By the time the Bureau held a 
conference in January 1918, the forceful internationalist voices of just 
a year before had become muted. Rather than talk about the 
relationship between civil liberties and international legal institutions, 
Baldwin and his colleagues focused on the protection of civil liberties 
in wartime as a “test of the highest type of loyalty”—loyalty not to 
global citizenship or to the idea of world federation, but to self-
consciously national ideals.276 
* * * 
Three further conferences in the next year—one still widely 
remembered, the others now more or less obscure—made clear the 
extent to which internationalist energies had waned. 1919 brought 
renewed hope to internationalists in the United States and across 
Europe. The Paris Peace Conference began in January, with Wilson 
promoting the internationalist idea of a League of Nations.277 At the 
same time, Jane Addams and the women’s branch of the 
internationalist movement assembled at Zurich in a renewed showing 
of the radical internationalism that had characterized the Woman’s 
Peace Parade at the early stages of the war. Eastman did not attend; 
leaders of the Zurich conference feared that the scandal of her 
divorce from Bennie and quick remarriage to Walter would 
undermine the respect accorded to the conference.278 And though 
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many internationalists bitterly opposed the indemnities imposed on 
Germany by the Treaty of Versailles that emerged in June, the Treaty 
nonetheless established what many internationalists had advocated 
for decades: a League of Nations “to promote international co-
operation and to achieve international peace and security.”279 
At the war’s end, the National Civil Liberties Bureau seemed 
poised to preside over a similar rebirth of its own internationalism. In 
June, as the Paris Conference wound down, the Bureau proposed an 
“international conference for the restoration of civil liberties.”280 The 
conference, to take place in New York in October, would reach out 
across national boundaries to begin the process of reconstituting 
prewar internationalist alliances. The Bureau arranged to cosponsor 
the conference with its British counterpart and namesake, the 
National Council for Civil Liberties. Indeed, Eastman and her 
husband Walter Fuller, with whom she had moved to London several 
months before, took the lead in organizing the British side of the 
event.281 Moreover, early signs suggested that the conference would 
resonate powerfully with the internationalist tradition. Arthur 
Ponsonby of the British antiwar organization Union for Democratic 
Control suggested that the conference might help create the 
“foundation of an enlightened and democratic internationalism.”282 B. 
N. Langdon-Davies of the National Council for Civil Liberties 
similarly assured his American counterparts that although the 
conference would focus on Anglo-American liberties, it would not cut 
against “the wider internationalism we all seek.”283 Early programs 
thus suggested that the conference would focus heavily on such issues 
as the “International Aspects of Civil Liberty,” and topics like “Why 
Freedom Matters—International Co-operation.”284  
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In some respects, the conference was a smashing success. Though 
Eastman’s old teacher Franklin Giddings refused to come (Giddings 
had supported U.S. intervention in the war), leading figures in 
American law such as Zachariah Chafee Jr., Felix Frankfurter, and 
Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School, all of whom were 
assuming important places in the early history of civil liberties in 
American law, came down from Cambridge for the event. Their 
prominence and their close connections to men on the Supreme 
Court and in the White House meant that support for the protection 
of civil liberties had moved from the eclectic margins of radical 
internationalism into the corridors of power.285 
From the internationalist perspective, however, the conference 
failed. Wilson had struggled mightily since his return from Paris to 
persuade the Senate to ratify his internationalist treaty.286 At the 
Anglo-American Tradition of Liberty Conference, too, 
internationalism foundered on the shoals of nationalist passions and 
difficult details. The conference was full of the high rhetoric of prewar 
internationalism. Speakers denounced “old assumptions of 
sovereignty and national honor” as ideas that “belong to the Middle 
Ages.”287 “Liberty is not national,”288 delegates declared, and they 
called for an internationalist system that would move beyond the 
“territorial basis”289 of the nation-state and beyond the “nationalistic 
segregation of peoples.”290 But in the new era of the League and the 
Paris Conference, the platitudes of prewar internationalism were no 
longer sufficient. Concrete proposals for international structures were 
the order of the day. Yet the extraordinary complexity of the 
international question and the impracticality of internationalist ideas 
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quickly became apparent.291 Delegates who favored gradual evolution 
toward internationalism clashed with those who urged immediate 
internationalist initiatives. Socialists clashed with liberals. 
Protonationalists from colonized regions like India and Ireland 
insisted on the priority of national independence over international 
structures, even as internationalists sought to subordinate nationalism 
to transnational institutions.292 Finding “a formula between 
nationalism and internationalism,” as Norman Thomas put it, proved 
impossible.293 By the final day of the conference, those in attendance 
were riven with dissension. The conference, Thomas warned, was “in 
danger of being lost in an unnecessary bog.”294 Debates over 
internationalism threatened to “wreck” the conference, cautioned 
another participant.295 And so they did. Just four weeks after Wilson’s 
famous stroke ensured the demise of the League of Nations in the 
U.S. Senate, the last gasp of wartime radical internationalism 
collapsed in a mess of differences and recriminations.296 
What the assembled participants in the Anglo-American 
Tradition of Liberty Conference could agree on was the value of civil 
liberties. Within a few months of the close of the conference, Baldwin 
reorganized the National Civil Liberties Bureau as the American 
Civil Liberties Union.297 The ACLU would continue to monitor 
international events, including the demise of the British National 
Council for Civil Liberties in 1920. But almost from the moment of its 
founding, Baldwin and the ACLU sought to obscure the 
organization’s internationalist beginnings. The Bureau, the ACLU’s 
organizers contended in 1920, had not been an “antiwar 
organization,”298 but rather an organization that “insisted on 
American constitutional rights.”299 Already in 1920, the center of 
attention for civil libertarians had shifted away from the question of 
war resistance and opposition to militarism, to the problem of the 
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“radicals, especially the I.W.W. . . . and the Socialists.”300 “Radicalism, 
not the attitude to the war,” now seemed the motivating factor in 
most instances of attacks on civil liberties.301 The ACLU thus 
organized itself to defend “peaceful picketing” and “trade unionism” 
and to fight discrimination against radicals and labor unions.302 Just as 
the ACLU would later purge communists from its ranks, the early 
ACLU had washed itself clean of its internationalist origins.303 
CONCLUSION 
What is striking about the development of a new language of 
civil liberties in American law between 1917 and 1920 is that it took 
part in both the modernist and the traditional idioms that the war 
occasioned. Historians have long debated the cultural consequences 
of the Great War. Some hold that the attempt to make sense of the 
brutal violence of modern nation-states touched off a deep shift 
toward the ironic and the modernist.304 Others argue that the war 
occasioned a powerful return to traditionalist rhetorics as a 
mechanism for coping with the apparent senselessness of the war. In 
Jay Winter’s influential formulation, for example, the war revived “a 
number of traditional languages” expressed in “unusual and modern 
forms.”305  
Like Winter’s distinctly modern traditionalists, lawyers such as 
Eastman responded to the war and to the rise of newly powerful state 
institutions by reinvigorating the familiar languages of rights and 
liberties that they had only recently rejected as Victorian 
anachronisms. For Eastman and her colleagues, the turn to rights 
advanced a strikingly modernist project in international law. The 
abstraction of rights seemed to offer a way to contain the dangerous 
abstraction of state sovereignty. Eastman’s internationalist 
appropriations of a traditional language of rights and liberties, in 
other words, were themselves deeply ironized. They sought to pick 
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and choose among the totems of a national tradition so as 
strategically to advance a modern internationalist agenda, identifying 
the abstraction of rights as more useful (and less dangerous) than the 
abstraction of sovereignty. The new civil liberties movement of the 
twentieth century was thus the product of a kind of double 
disillusionment with the fixtures of nineteenth-century legal 
thought—rights and states. And yet in the searing heat of wartime 
patriotism, internationalist modernism quickly gave way to more 
straightforwardly traditional arguments rooted ever more deeply in 
the trappings of American national identity. The traditional language 
of rights overwhelmed the internationalist agenda that the rhetoric of 
rights had been marshaled to advance. Indeed, within a few short 
years, Baldwin’s recrafting of the civil liberties movement would 
obscure almost completely the movement’s international law 
beginnings. 
Eastman herself refused to compromise with the imperatives of 
the nation-state. As John Haynes Holmes later remembered, 
Eastman “could not, or more likely would not, surrender the 
idealism” that had brought her to the internationalist cause.306 She 
therefore never embraced the Bill of Rights and civil liberties as 
wholeheartedly as Baldwin did, strategically or otherwise. The First 
Amendment, she wrote from London, had “never” been “any good in 
a crisis”; it had “never been proof against a strain.”307 As labor unions, 
socialists, and the ACLU turned to civil liberties to advance their 
causes, she contended that those safeguards had never been “of much 
practical value in protecting the poorest workers.”308 Especially after 
U.S. intervention in Russia in 1918, Eastman’s own views radicalized 
dramatically. By 1920, she adopted a form of Bolshevik communism. 
A “capitalist state,” she wrote, would never “maintain democratic 
institutions against its own interest.”309 Even in the woman’s 
movement in which she had worked for legal change since childhood, 
Eastman lost hope in the reform possibilities of the law. Feminism 
could “most assuredly” not accomplish real sex equality through legal 
change, she argued; sex discrimination was instead a problem “of 
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education, of early training.”310 “We must,” she concluded, “bring up 
feminist sons.”311 
Eastman, it seems, had encountered limits to lawyering. In 
Eastman’s day, as still in our own, the authority of law and of lawyers 
derived principally from the very sovereign states that Eastman 
sought to critique. Lawyering therefore seemed to come with 
powerful institutional limits. To be sure, nation-state institutions were 
not immune to legal change. The United States’s constitutive legal 
documents, for example, provided resources on which Eastman and 
her colleagues drew to launch the modern civil liberties movement. 
Over the succeeding decades, moreover, international lawyers—
walking in the footsteps of internationalists before them—would 
make painstaking progress in establishing human rights norms to 
constrain sovereignty’s prerogatives.312 But institutions also proved 
powerfully resistant to the transformations that Eastman and the 
radical internationalists had sought to bring about. If for almost a 
century lawyer-skeptics have turned to the abstraction of civil 
liberties, perhaps they have done so because of the persistent power 
of the abstraction of sovereignty. 
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